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International Criminal Law Aspects of the
War Against Terrorism
Michael Newton1
n March 4, 1801, Thomas Jefferson, the newly inaugurated President
of the United States, took charge of a nation torn between the possi-
bilities of the new century and the uncertainty caused by the changing face of
warfare. America was a new republic very much aware of its vulnerability, yet
facing the future with faith built on dedication to the dual pillars of peace
through justice and peace through strength.2 As President Jefferson rose to de-
liver his inaugural address, America faced a new century filled with new dan-
gers and unfolding challenges that threatened to erode the very foundations of
our liberty and collective peace. His inaugural message was rooted in our demo-
cratic values, yet articulated an American vision to propel us forward as a na-
tion of purpose and principle in the international arena.
1. Lieutenant Colonel Newton is an Assistant Professor of Law at the US Military Academy at
West Point. He may be reached at michael.newton@usma.edu. The opinions and conclusions of
this paper, as well as its flaws, are solely attributable to the author. They do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Judge Advocate General, the United States Military Academy, the United States
Army, the United States Department of State, or any other federal entity.
2. Robert F. Turner, State Sovereignty, International Law, and the Use of Force in Countering Low-
Intensity Aggression in the Modern World, in LEGAL AND MORAL CONSTRAINTS ON LOW-
INTENSITY CONFLICT, 44 (Alberto R. Coll, et al. eds., 1995), (Vol. 67, US Naval War College
International Law Studies).
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Summarizing the themes that would guide America through the uncertain-
ties of a new era, President Jefferson began his speech by asserting the founda-
tional principle of seeking “[e]qual and exact justice to all men, of whatever
state or persuasion, religious or political.”3 President Jefferson portrayed a
“bright constellation” composed of nonnegotiable values that would combine
to form the “creed of our political faith” and serve as the touchstone for the fu-
ture.4 He pointedly told the nation that “should we wander from them in mo-
ments of error or alarm, let us hasten to retrace our steps, and to regain the
road which alone leads us to peace, liberty, and safety.”5 After over two hun-
dred years, these remain in many ways the core objectives for which we strive,
albeit in a much more complicated and changed world.
The shock of the events of September 11 was a visceral kick to the con-
sciousness of the world. Similar to the September 1972 kidnapping and mur-
der of nine Israeli athletes participating in the Munich Olympics,6 these
terrorist attacks were one of those rare galvanizing events that resonated
across our globe. The attacks directed against America affected every culture,
age group, religion, and corner of civilization. Though terrorism is not a new
phenomenon, the September 11 attacks killed citizens of over 80 nations and
stunned the world by their scope and savagery. In rallying the support of the
American people for the campaign against the terrorist aggressors and ex-
plaining his vision for the strategic campaign against terrorism, President Bush
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3. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801, reprinted in WILLIAM J. BENNETT,
THE SPIRIT OF AMERICA 347 (1997).
4. Id. Among the other principles that Mr. Jefferson promulgated were,
peace, commerce, and honest friendship, with all nations, entangling alliances with
none; the support of state governments in all their rights, as the most competent
administration for our domestic concerns, and the surest bulwarks against anti-
republican tendencies: — the preservation of the general government in its whole
constitutional vigour (sic), as the sheet anchor of our peace at home, and safety
abroad . . . the diffusion of information, and arraignment of all abuses at the bar of public
reason: — freedom of religion; freedom of the press; and freedom of person, under the
protection of the habeas corpus: — and trial by juries impartially selected.
5. Id.
6. This 1972 attack was in fact the catalyst for the creation of modern US counter-terrorism
policy structures. Vincent Cannistraro and David C. Bresett, The Terrorist Threat In America, in
ALEXANDER MUNSCH, 16 TERRORISM/DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL
CONTROL 3, 26 (1998).
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returned perhaps unconsciously to the themes articulated by President Jeffer-
son over two centuries before.7
On September 20, 2001, President Bush addressed a Joint Session of Con-
gress, aware that the world—and perhaps the terrorist network—was listening.
The President declared, “we are a country awakened to danger and called to
defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution.
Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, jus-
tice will be done.”8 President Bush’s declaration of this clear national goal was
met by the thunderous applause of the assembled Congress and audience
(which also included British Prime Minister Tony Blair). His words stirred citi-
zens across America to strengthen a communal resolve and rededicate a mu-
tual commitment to the goal of justice. President Bush further declared that
the campaign against international terrorism9 is more than just a fight to secure
325
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7. In another interesting and perhaps ironic parallel, President Jefferson was selected as the third
chief executive in the wake of one of the most bitterly contested and divisive presidential
elections in US history. Article II, section 1, clause 3 of the US Constitution specifies that the
House of Representatives shall select the President by ballot if more than one candidate amasses
the same number of electoral votes. The House of Representatives did not select President
Jefferson until after a lengthy debate and thirty-five ballots. C.B. TAYLOR, A UNIVERSAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA EMBRACING THE WHOLE PERIOD FROM THE
EARLIEST DISCOVERIES TO THE PRESENT TIME 250 (1836).
8. President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress, September 30, 2001;
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (Jan. 30,
2003). Secretary of State Powell echoed a similar sentiment in his first public comments made
from Lima, Peru:
A terrible, terrible tragedy has befallen my nation, but . . . you can be sure that America
will deal with this tragedy in a way that brings those responsible to justice. You can be
sure that as terrible a day as this is for us, we will get through it because we are a strong
nation, a nation that believes in itself.
BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 10 (2002).
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331, providing that for the purposes of the federal criminal law, the term
“international terrorism” means activities that
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if
committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended –
(i.) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii.) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii.)to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territory jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend
national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons
they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which the perpetrators
operate or seek asylum.
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American freedoms because it is “civilization’s fight” in the sense that it will be
waged on behalf of all the people who “believe in progress and pluralism, toler-
ance and freedom.”10
Seeking to achieve the goal of justice, the Bush Administration has re-
shaped the machinery of government around the changed security environ-
ment. For example, the National Security Strategy of the United States
focuses on attaining the goal of justice:
[i]n pursuit of our goals, our first imperative is to clarify what we stand for: the
United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right
and true for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no
nation is exempt from them. Fathers and mothers in all societies want their
children to be educated and to live free from poverty and violence. No people
on earth yearn to be oppressed, aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight
knock of the secret police. America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable
demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the
state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women;
religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property. 11
Though the concept of seeking “justice” to achieve core national security
goals has been a thread of American political dialogue from the early days of
our Republic, the concrete form of that pursuit in practice retains an elusive,
often ephemeral, character. “Justice” as a component of US foreign policy is a
valued but vague objective. In the post-September 11 security environment,
there is no doubt that the inherent and sovereign right of self-defense permits
the United States to mete out “justice” using its military power.12 However,
the holistic pursuit of justice embodies a parallel dimension of personal penal
responsibility. Pursuing personal criminal accountability against international
terrorists necessarily entails a complicated political dynamic because of the
persistence of state sponsorship ranging from philosophical sympathy to active
operational support in the form of funding and official sanction for planning
and training within the territorial bounds of the state.
The threats to national security presently posed by international terrorism
require a balance between personal punishment of criminal perpetrators and
326
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10. Joint Session, supra note 8.
11. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 (September
2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (Dec. 1, 2002).
12. See Jack M. Beard, America’s New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under
International Law, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 559 (2002).
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the use of military power to eliminate the threats posed by terrorists. Interna-
tional terrorism remains a national security problem because it is a unique
form of transnational crime in which private actors seek to unravel the fabric
of civilized society and thereby undermine state, regional, and global security.
The simple term “international terrorism” belies the reality that the deep-
seated ideological motives of participants in terrorist acts combine with politi-
cal reality and the interplay of seemingly insoluble root causes to make it per-
haps the most difficult of all the problems facing international society.
President Bush’s vision reshaped the paradigm for punishing terrorists from an
exclusive reliance on judicial mechanisms to address criminal conduct into a
war-fighting model. In that sense the war on terrorism is much more than a
politically convenient phrase. It is a new paradigm which requires an inter-
face between effective judicial mechanisms capable of prosecuting those
perpetrators who are not eliminated or emasculated by the application of
military power.
This essay will argue that international crimes of terrorism should be han-
dled domestically by individual states using existing criminal law mechanisms.
Rather than blindly heeding the siren’s song of international institutional-
ization, the states of the world should rededicate themselves to decisively ad-
dressing terrorist crimes using their sovereign forums. Bound by a sense of
unity arising from the ashes of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the
nations of the world now have a propitious opportunity to reconsider the ap-
propriate forums for addressing international crimes of terrorism. Calls for an
international criminal process to address terrorism assume the existence of
the discrete discipline termed international criminal law which in turn implies
a normative superiority of internationalized mechanisms over domestic fo-
rums. However, the existence of transnational terrorism and the cooperation
of nationals from a variety of nations in the planning and execution of terror-
ist attacks does not mean that those crimes are properly punished in a supra-
national penal forum.
This essay superimposes the established framework for addressing terrorist
crimes against the arguments in favor of a newly created supranational judi-
cial forum; because the problem of transnational terrorism does not raise any
of the problems that have been previously addressed by the establishment of
an internationalized process, such a supranational forum is unnecessary and
could actually undermine the pursuit of justice. The current legal framework
is a collage akin to a patchwork quilt of existing norms and conventions that
seeks to prevent and punish specifically identified terrorist activities. The
international community has come together to address the core problem of
Michael Newton
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transnational terrorism by negotiating a web of occasionally overlapping mul-
tilateral conventions. Although this web of conventional law13 is built on the
cornerstone of sovereign enforcement of applicable norms, the persistence of
transnational terrorism as a feature of the international community shows
that the existing conventional framework is not a panacea.14 This essay, nev-
ertheless, concludes that the voluntary efforts of sovereign states to imple-
ment and enforce international norms would not be materially enhanced by
the creation of a new superstructure of supranational justice.
The Prospects for an International Terrorist Tribunal
Modern international law embodies a significant body of law and practice that
empowers domestic states to adjudicate terrorist crimes. Recent arguments,
however, have postulated that an internationalized enforcement mechanism is
warranted simply by virtue of the international nature of the problems posed by
transnational terrorism. International law often evolves in response to per-
ceived weaknesses in the normative structure that are highlighted by current
events.15 This is the pattern for the post-September 11 wave of thinking about
the linkage between international terrorism and an internationalized trial pro-
cess. Given the inability of domestic forums to eradicate transnational terror-
ism, it is understandable that the aftermath of September 11 saw a groundswell
of support for the creation of an international judicial forum to prosecute such
terrorists. Even as they acknowledge that national courts are the backbone for
the systematic prosecution of international terrorists, some scholars have
pointed out that an international forum would “symbolize global justice for
global crimes.”16
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13. See infra notes 72 to 83.
14. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS
(1937–2001)(2001); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy
Oriented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT. L. J. 83, 90 (2001).
15. See generally GEOFFREY BEST, WAR & LAW SINCE 1945 (1994)(focusing on the historical
development of the law of armed conflict in response to the stimuli of world events, changing
technology, and the weaknesses of codified law as demonstrated by new types of conflicts); M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1–87
(2d ed. 1999)(explaining the development of the law regarding crimes against humanity as a
logical progression in response to world affairs and the development of human rights law).
16. Luncheon Address: Rogue Regimes and the Individualization of International Law, Anne-
Marie Slaughter, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 815, 820 (2002)(comments based on a more detailed
explication found in Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International
Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT. L. J. 1 (2002)).
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However, this strain of thought is merely the current incarnation of an
older set of discarded ideas. Despite nearly a century of discussion and debate,
the nations of the world have not agreed on a comprehensive definition of ter-
rorism,17 which is the obvious cornerstone of any international forum with ju-
risdiction over transnational terrorist acts. States instead shifted from a
universal and general approach towards cooperative efforts to define and
criminalize specific manifestations of terrorism through specific multilateral
treaties which bind signatory states to proscribe and punish such acts using
domestic systems.
As a logical corollary, states have repeatedly rejected proposals for an over-
arching international tribunal charged with prosecuting crimes of transna-
tional terrorism. The repeated formal rejections of terrorism as an
international problem that should be addressed in supranational judicial fo-
rums date back to the League of Nations era.18 In 1926, the International
Congress of Penal Law recommended that the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice “be competent to judge individual liabilities” incurred as a result
of crimes considered as international offenses “which constitute a threat to
world peace.”19 This proposal died on the vine of international diplomacy.
The assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in Marseilles on Octo-
ber 9, 1934 prompted the French government to propose an international
convention for the suppression of terrorism in a letter to the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the League of Nations.20 The core of the French proposal was a sugges-
tion that an international criminal court would be the most feasible forum for
addressing political crimes of an international character, and the Council of
the League responded by establishing a Committee of Experts to prepare a
preliminary draft of “an international convention to assure the repression of
329
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17. See W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L. L. 3,
22 (1999); Consensus Eludes Legal Committee in Final Act of Session as it Recommends Blanket
Condemnation of Terrorism, Press Release GA/L/3140, Nov. 23, 1999.
18. Voeau of the International Congress of Penal Law Concerning an International Criminal Court
(Brussels, 1926), reprinted in Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction,
Memorandum Submitted by the Secretary-General 74, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7Rev.1 (1949)
(Translating the original French text found in Premier congres international de droit penal, Actes du
congres 634).
19. Id. This strain of thought eventually led to the development of a draft statute for a criminal
chamber of the Permanent International Court of Justice, 34th Report of the International Law
Association 113–125 (1927).
20. Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, Memorandum Submitted
by the Secretary General 16, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7Rev.1 (1949).
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conspiracies or crimes committed with a political and terrorist purpose.”21
From November 1–16, 1937, the International Conference for the Repression
of Terrorism met in Geneva and adopted a Convention for the Creation of an
International Criminal Court.22 This effort at an international forum to re-
spond to terrorism was implicitly rejected by the international community af-
ter only one state (Italy) ratified the multilateral treaty.
Although the proposed 1937 Convention never entered into force23 it re-
mains highly relevant to the current debate for two reasons. In the first place,
the jurisdiction of the international court proposed in the 1937 treaty derived
solely from the consent of the affected states,24 and the court was limited to
applying the “least severe” domestic law of either the state in which the crimes
were committed or the state of the offender’s nationality.25 In effect, the 1937
Convention created an internationalized process for applying the substantive
law of different domestic systems, which is the antithesis for modern argu-
ments that an international forum is essential for applying the international
norms against terrorism.
This model of the 1937 Convention is really the precursor for the Lockerbie
Court26 and stands in sharp contrast to current efforts to portray transnational
terrorism as an international problem that requires a generalized international
definition and jurisdiction. Secondly, it is important to note that every one of
330
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21. Id. See also 15 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 1760 (1934) (containing the text of the full
resolution passed by the Council).
22. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, opened for signature Nov. 16,
1937, 19 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 23 (1938), League of Nations Doc. C.546(I).M.383(I)1937.V
(1938), reprinted in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL
CONVENTIONS (1937–2001) 71 (2001) [hereinafter 1937 Convention].
23. After the Convention was transmitted to all the members of the League of Nations, 24 states
signed the Convention but only India actually ratified its text.
24. 1937 Convention, supra note 22, art. 21 (referring to the obligation of the domestic states to
enact criminal legislation to punish the acts defined in the underlying multilateral treaty and
empowering those same states to “commit the accused to trial” before the International Criminal
Court). This provision is in stark contrast to the highly controversial jurisdictional provisions of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which allow the ICC to bypass non-
consenting states in establishing personal jurisdiction over their citizens. Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9,
arts. 12–19 reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 998 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
25. 1937 Convention, supra note 22, art. 21.
26. The Scottish Court in the Netherlands was an internationalized process applying Scottish
law to prosecute the Libyan nationals responsible for the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.
See http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/index1.asp?path=%2Fhtml%2Flockerbie%2Easp (Jan. 30,
2003).
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the multilateral conventions in the sixty-five years of international dialogue
since the 1937 Convention have adhered to its pattern by defining different
terrorist acts as substantive violations of international law and specifically re-
quiring sovereign states to enact domestic criminal legislation for the purpose
of punishing those acts. This uniform historical pattern undercuts faddish ar-
guments that the very nature of transnational terrorism requires an interna-
tional forum and forces proponents of an internationalized process to bear the
burden of overturning the customary practice of the international community.
Another persistent strain of thought after September 11 postulated that in-
ternational prosecutions would appear more legitimate, particularly to Mus-
lim states, than domestic prosecutions, which could be seen with some
suspicion overseas. In the view of some commentators, the perceived illegiti-
macy of US domestic mechanisms, especially the Military Commissions au-
thorized by President Bush,27 mitigates towards the creation of an
international supranational tribunal. For example, Justice Richard Goldstone,
the first chief prosecutor for the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY),
speculated that the perceived difficulty of obtaining a fair trial for terrorists in
the United States would cause some countries to resist extraditions to domes-
tic courts, whereas those same countries would be legally barred from resisting




27. See Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 FED. REG. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) (while it is beyond the
scope of this essay to completely assess the merits of the forthcoming military commissions, the
order defines the class of persons subject to the jurisdiction of military commissions as “any
individual who is not a United States citizen” with respect to whom the President determines in
writing that there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times (i) is or was a
member of al Qaeda, or (ii) has engaged in, aided, or abetted or conspired to commit acts of
international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore, that have caused, threatened to cause,
or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens,
national security, foreign policy or economy; or (iii) has knowingly harbored one or more
individuals described in subparagraphs (i) or (ii).)
28. Henry Weinstein, A Trial Too Big for the U.S.?, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, A1; Ed
Vulliamy, US Dilemma Over Trials of bin Laden, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED OBSERVER, Nov. 4,
2001 (quoting Justice Goldstone as favoring international tribunals for the prosecution of
terrorists and speculating that he would be selected as the first chief prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court), available at http://www.observer.uk.co/afghanistan/story/
0,1501,587365,00.html (Jan. 30, 2003).
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Additionally, in the words of one prominent international lawyer if “we’re
thinking in terms of a global war on terrorism in the long-term, it would be
better to try [bin Laden] in an international forum where we could get the in-
put, but also the condemnation of judges from all the world’s legal systems un-
der both national and international law.”29 In a similar vein, the current ICTY
prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, reported that “quite a few people” at United Na-
tions headquarters revealed in private conversations that prosecuting terror-
ists in The Hague would be the “most valid solution.”30 This would of course
require the Security Council to expand the mandate of the ICTY. Ms. Del
Ponte perhaps revealed her agenda for suggesting such an expansion with the
caveat that “[i]f the Security Council were to decide to pursue that path, it
would have to increase the funding earmarked for the Hague Tribunal.”31
The Military Order authorizing military commissions has been one of the
most controversial aspects of the United States’ efforts to bring justice to ter-
rorists,32 yet even its most vocal critics accept that such forums promulgated
under the President’s constitutional authority as commander-in-chief are
332
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29. America’s Legal War on Terrorism: Are These Rules for Hunting Terrorists; Could bin Laden
be Brought to Trial (CNN Burden of Proof broadcast, Oct. 6, 2001), cited in David J. Scheffer, The
Future of Atrocity Law, SUFFOLK TRANS. L. REV. 389, 390 n.3 (Summer, 2002). This view perhaps
represents a modern incarnation of the views articulated by the then Secretary of State Thomas
Jefferson in a letter dated April 18, 1793, 8 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 11 (1904):
Compacts . . . between nation and nation, are obligatory on them by the same moral law
which obliges individuals to observe their compacts. . . . It is true that nations are to be
judges for themselves; since no one nation has a right to sit in judgment over another,
but the tribunal of our conscience remains, and that also of the opinion of the world.
These will review the sentence we pass in our own case, and as we respect these, we
must see that in judging ourselves we have honestly done the part of impartial and
rigorous judges.
30. Prosecutor Del Ponte Hopes to Try Bin Laden in The Hague, Interview with the Hague
International War Crimes Tribunal Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, Rome L’Avvenire, Dec. 2,
2001 (copy on file with author).
31. Id.
32. James Podgers, ABA Tackles Tribunals Issue, 1 A.B.A. J. e-Report, Feb. 8, 2002, available at
http://www.abamet.org/journal/ereport/f8midtribus.html (Jan. 30, 2003); DAVID J. SCHEFFER,
OPTIONS FOR PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR
PEACE SPECIAL REPORT (2001), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr78.html
(Jan. 30, 2003).
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“clearly authorized under international law.”33 From this perspective, rather
than sanctioning a “multiplicity of trials in various countries” the creation of
an overarching international tribunal that could perhaps include participation
of Islamic judges is being packaged as a part of the international coalition
against terrorism.34 Nevertheless, allowing sovereign states to bypass their do-
mestic enforcement mechanisms and abdicate their responsibilities to a newly
spawned international mechanism is not likely to be an effective response in
the long term.
The cries for an international tribunal imply that an international response
is always appropriate for crimes grounded in international law that shock the
conscience of mankind, which in turn implies an unseemly assertion that do-
mestic prosecutions are always inappropriate and unfair. While terrorism is
widespread, and may be impossible to eradicate, the compelling motivations
that have required the formation of international forums in other contexts are
notably absent.
In other words, despite the inherent difficulty of investigating and prose-
cuting international terrorists, there is no culture of impunity because one or
several sovereign states will always have jurisdiction, political will, and a very
strong motivation to prosecute that particular set of terrorists when there is
available evidence sufficient to sustain conviction of persons who are within
the substantive and personal jurisdiction of the sovereign state. Creation of an
international forum specifically designed to respond to crimes of terrorism
would be a wholly new development in the field of international criminal law
because it would be the first time that an international forum was created
solely due to the nature of the crimes committed. If the nations of the world
are committed to combating the core problem of transnational terrorism, the
best place is in the domestic forums of affected states. This approach will ac-
complish the most in the long term to ensure that the rule of law is strength-
ened and justice is done.
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33. William Glaberson, U.S. Faces Tough Choices If Bin Laden Is Captured, N.Y. TIMES, B5, Oct.
22, 2001; Michael R. Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: the Bush Administration’s Military Tribunals in
Historical Perspective 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 433, 441 (Spring, 2002). The Bush Administration has
pointedly reminded the world that the procedures published that will govern the conduct of any
Military Commissions authorized by the President are in full compliance with the international
standards, Article 75, Protocol I. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977).
34. Comments by Justice Richard Goldstone, Bringing International Criminals to Justice, John
F. Kennedy Library and Foundation Responding to Terrorism Series, Nov. 12, 2001, available at
http://www.jfklibrary.net.forum_goldstone.html (Jan. 30, 2003).
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“International Criminal Law”
Similarly, an international terrorist tribunal is not warranted by the very exis-
tence of an emerging collection of concepts and processes termed “interna-
tional criminal law.” The concept of international criminal law springs from the
intersection of two distinct legal planes; due to the nature of the international
system, the criminal aspects of international law are necessarily implemented
through the criminal justice systems of sovereign states. For the purposes of this
essay, it is important to realize that the simple recognition of legal norms under
international law in no way leads ineluctably to the conclusion that the most
appropriate, or even most desirable forum, is an internationalized court.
Though some states cooperate to prescribe some norms in binding interna-
tional obligations,35 the domestic criminal systems of sovereign states present
a competing set of pragmatic and practical challenges in implementing and
enforcing those same norms. The criminal aspects of international law origi-
nate in the choices made by sovereign states who united to criminalize certain
conduct under established international norms.36 In other words, the mecha-
nisms of diplomacy and state consent work together to define and proscribe
certain conduct to the point that it ripens into a violation of substantive inter-
national norms. From the standpoint of developing binding norms of conduct
through the evolution of international law, the twentieth century was a period
of almost breathtaking development.
At the same time, the development of international forums lagged behind
the substantive development of crimes defined and articulated as a matter of
international law. Indeed, the principle that states are obligated to use domes-
tic forums to punish violations of international law has roots that run back to
the ideas of Hugo Grotius.37 The very nature of sovereign power allows the do-
mestic forums of a state to punish criminals whether their crimes derive from
international norms or domestic prohibitions. As early as 1842, US Secretary
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35. Professor Bassiouni has listed 24 categories of international crime generated from 274
international conventions that help guide the merger of international law with criminal law. M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTIONS AND THEIR PENAL
PROVISIONS 20–21 (1997).
36. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 27 (John Dugard & Christine van den
Wyngaert, eds. 1996)(summarizing some twenty different acts and types of conduct criminalized
under binding international conventions and discussing the differing approaches to enforcing
international criminal norms).
37. RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT (1999).
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of State Daniel Webster articulated the idea that a nation’s sovereignty also
entails “the strict and faithful observance of all those principles, laws, and us-
ages which have obtained currency among civilized states, and which have for
their object the mitigation of the miseries of war.”38
One way to envision the current state of international criminal law is to
imagine that pure domestic enforcement of international norms and the re-
finement of new and more effective international forums are like two sliding
tectonic plates. Even though the body of terrorist conventions followed the
pattern of requiring domestic enforcement, there is an inherent tension at the
fault line between domestic and international criminal forums because the ju-
risdictional allocation is a zero sum game with regard to a particular individual
or criminal act.
The phrase “international criminal law” describes a deceptively simple con-
cept that is not confined to the title of law review articles or the spines of li-
brary books. The expression obscures the reality that its genesis lies in the
lawmaking processes of the international community, and cannot therefore be
seen as a linear exercise of legislative mandate accompanied by international
judicial enforcement. The field of “international criminal law” is an ambigu-
ous concept with indistinct boundaries.39
Because no single class of crimes or isolated body of law forms an accurate
and complete foundation for the currently existing tribunals created at the in-
ternational level to punish individuals for violations of international law, one
distinguished scholar and diplomat has proposed the unifying concept of
“atrocity crimes.”40 In short, the concept of international criminal law is more
than a mere aspiration to be attained yet falls short of being a constrained
body of law with an empirical existence and definable contours. For the close
observer of this dynamic field, it is not surprising that there is an undercurrent




38. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, 1 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5–6 (1906).
39. Though international criminal law certainly includes the body of law proscribing
international terrorism, this concept also includes crimes against humanity (and its component
parts of persecution of minority populations) torture, some human rights violations, war crimes
(both in the classic sense of conflicts between nation states and in the growing body of law
regulating conduct in the context of non-international armed conflicts), genocide, and other
transnational crimes such as piracy, slavery, and drug trafficking.
40. David J. Scheffer, The Future of Atrocity Law, SUFFOLK TRANS. L. REV. 389, 398 (Summer,
2002).
41. See, e.g., Leslie C. Green, Is There an International Criminal Law?, 21 ALBERTA L. REV. 251
(1983).
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As a result of this ambiguity, during the negotiations of the Elements of
Crimes required by Article 9 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC),42 some delegations vehemently voiced their view that the con-
cept of “international criminal law” is too ill defined and vague to have any
practical meaning. The Elements of Crimes are designed to “assist the Court in
the interpretation and application” of the norms defined in the Rome Stat-
ute.43 The Rome Statute also stipulates that the Court “shall apply” the Ele-
ments of Crimes during its decision-making.44 After agreeing that the Elements
of Crimes would be much more than a summarized, non-binding set of brief
comments, the delegates negotiated a detailed list of the component parts for
every one of the numerous offenses proscribed in the Rome Statute with the
understanding that the prosecutor must prove each element beyond a reason-
able doubt to sustain a conviction for that offense. A number of delegations felt
that referencing a discrete body of “international criminal law” in the Elements
of Crimes document would introduce exactly the kind of circular vagueness
that would defeat the very purpose of negotiating elements for each offense.
After extensive debate, the nations of the world joined consensus on the
Final Draft Elements of Crimes. The Elements of Crimes are enshrined in a
single, accessible document that takes otherwise amorphous crimes and delin-
eates the conduct, consequences, and circumstances for every offense, along
with the mens rea that attaches to each component of each crime. This is an
important development because it portends the possibility that nations
around the world now have a unified, consensus document to consult when
considering the normative content of the crimes of genocide, found in Article 6
of the Rome Statute, crimes against humanity, contained in Article 7, and the
expansive list of war crimes contained in Article 8.
The Elements of Crimes are a crosscut of legal norms that are an off-the-
shelf source of accessible detail to assist domestic jurisdictions throughout the
world, in addition to serving as a resource for judicial activities in the interna-
tional arena. Many states are using the agreed elements as a framework for im-
plementing those crimes within their domestic enforcement mechanisms.
For the purposes of this essay, the Elements do embody consensus agree-
ment on the concept of an autonomous legal field termed “international crim-
inal law.” The chapeau language to the Article 7 crimes states clearly that the
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42. Elements of Crimes, Adopted September 10, 2002, reprinted in Report of the Assembly of
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1st Sess., 108–155, U.N.
Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (2002).
43. Id., art. 9(1).
44. Id., art. 21.
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crimes against humanity provisions relate to “international criminal law” and
accordingly “should be strictly construed.”45 This diplomatic result recognized
the emergence of an interrelated system in which domestic forums are respon-
sible for implementing international norms, but in no way elevated interna-
tional forums to a de facto hierarchical supremacy.
The Internationalization of International Criminal Law
The development of a general body of legal norms along with the emergence of
a system termed in shorthand “international criminal law” does not mean that
international forums are the preferred judicial enforcement mechanism. The
pursuit of accountability for international crimes is a notable aspect of Presi-
dent Bush’s recent observation that the nations of the world are “joined in seri-
ous purpose—very serious purposes—on which the safety of our people and the
fate of our freedom now rest. We build a world of justice, or we will live in a
world of coercion.”46 Nevertheless, international forums have been the courts
of last resort rather than the courts primarily charged as the optimal first
response.
Although states cooperate together to define and proscribe crimes under
international law, the domestic courts of the world have the primary role in
punishing violations and securing the rule of law.47 The debate over the
phrase “international criminal law” described above reflected a continuing
tension between the international respect for sovereign justice systems, and
the transcendent importance of truth and accountability. Phrased another
way, none of the international forums in recent history have been created to
enforce international norms simply because the offenses were defined and pro-
scribed by the power of international law. Rather, internationalized mecha-
nisms have been created only as a necessary fallback when domestic forums
have failed to enforce the transcendent norms of international law.
337
Michael Newton
45. U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2 (2000).
46. Remarks by the President to a Special Session of the Bundestag, May 23, 2002, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020523-2.html (Nov. 20, 2002).
47. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann-Supreme Court Opinion, reprinted in 36 I.L.R.
18, 26, (Isr. Dist. Ct.-Jerusalem, 1961), aff’d 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. Sup. Ct., 1962) (international law
is “in the absence of an International Court, in need of the judicial and legislative organs of every
country to give effect to its criminal interdictions and to bring the criminals to trial”).
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For example, in responding to what President Roosevelt later described as
the “blackest crimes in all history,”48 the Allied Powers issued the Moscow
Declaration on October 30, 1943.49 German forces were able to commit al-
most unthinkable brutalities under the shield of Nazi sovereignty. Adolf Hit-
ler imposed the Fuehrerprinzip (leadership principle) in order to exercise his
will as supreme through the police, the courts, the military, and all the other
institutions of organized German society.50 The oath of the Nazi party stated:
“I owe inviolable fidelity to Adolf Hitler; I vow absolute obedience to him and
to the leaders he designates for me.”51 Accordingly, power resided in Hitler,
from whom subordinates derived absolute authority in hierarchical order.
This absolute and unconditional obedience to the superior in all areas of pub-
lic and private life led in Justice Jackson’s famous words to “a National Social-
ist despotism equaled only by the dynasties of the ancient East.”52
Sheltered from international scrutiny by German sovereign prerogative, the
domestic system was harnessed to prevent a judicial response to the horren-
dous crimes committed because the outcomes of prosecutions were predeter-
mined to accord with the political guidance of the Fuehrer. The rule of law in
Germany was therefore twisted to conform to the Nazi party rather than the
principles of restraint and justice. In response, the Allied powers used the Mos-
cow Declaration to make punishing those perpetrators53 a key allied war goal.
In the context of the current debate over internationalizing justice, it is im-
portant to note that the Moscow Declaration specifically favored punishment
through the national courts in the countries where the crimes were committed.
The Declaration specifically stated that German criminals were to be “sent
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48. Statement by the President, March 24, 1944, reprinted in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY
TRIBUNALS 12, DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 3080, WASHINGTON D.C. (1945)
[hereinafter Jackson Report].
49. IX Department of State Bulletin, No. 228, 310, reprinted in Jackson Report, supra note 48, at
11. The Moscow Declaration was actually issued to the Press on November 1, 1943. For an
account of the political and legal maneuvering behind the effort to bring this stated war aim into
actuality, see PETER MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY 85–110 (2000).
50. DREXEL A. SPRECHER, INSIDE THE NUREMBERG TRIAL: A PROSECUTOR’S
COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT 1037–38.
51. Id. at 157.
52. Opening Statement to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, II TRIAL OF THE
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 100 (1947)
[hereinafter TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS].
53. After extensive debate over the relative merits of the terms “perpetrator” or “accused” the
delegates to the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) ultimately agreed to use the former in the
finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes for the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2 (2000).
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back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that
they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated
countries and of the free governments which will be erected therein.”54 The
precedence was clearly stated for building the rule of law at the domestic level,
even though the subject matter jurisdiction for horrific violations came from
international law. Presaging the actual International Military Tribunal, the
Declaration went on to proclaim that major criminals whose crimes had “no
particular geographical localization” would be punished by joint decision of the
Allied governments.55
Seen through the prism of international criminal law, the Moscow Declara-
tion and the subsequent London Charter did not elevate the international fo-
rum to an automatic precedence and superiority. The international forum was
limited only to those offenses where a single country had no greater grounds
for claiming jurisdiction than another country. Justice Jackson recognized this
reality in his famous opening statement. He accepted the fact that the Inter-
national Military Tribunal was merely an alternative to domestic courts for
prosecuting the “symbols of fierce nationalism and of militarism.”56 He further
clarified that any defendants who succeeded in “escaping the condemnation
of this Tribunal . . . will be delivered up to our continental Allies.”57
Following the legacy of Nuremberg by nearly fifty years, the current ad hoc
tribunals were both created in contexts where justice would not be achieved
or even pursued in domestic forums. Instead of being driven by an abstract
evaluation of the nature of the offenses as violations of international law, the
international community focused on the need to prosecute offenders by filling
the domestic enforcement void with an international tribunal. In the Former
Republic of Yugoslavia, the Milosevic regime exercised dictatorial power over
the Yugoslav judicial system that prevented any accountability for the wide-
spread violations of international law. Thus, the “particular circumstances” of
the impunity in the Former Yugoslavia warranted the creation of the interna-
tional tribunal.58
Similarly, in the context of the genocide in Rwanda, the Security Council
created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) where there
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54. Eichmann, supra note 47.
55. Id.
56. TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 52, at 99.
57. Id. at 100.
58. Report of the Secretary General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808
(1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2-5704, para. 26 (1993).
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would have otherwise been a prosecutorial void. The genocide ripped apart
Rwandan society. All the judges fled and the judicial system was in total disar-
ray. In the case of Rwanda, the problem was not a lack of political will, but a
complete breakdown of the rule of law hampered by a judicial system deemed
to be incapable of addressing the mass of violations.59
Both the ICTY and ICTR drew their lifeblood from the political process of
the Security Council because the only viable system of justice would have
been a newly created international forum. From the perspective of Charter le-
gal authority, the ICTY and ICTR are best understood as enforcement mea-
sures of a judicial nature. In other words, the Security Council was forced by
the circumstances at hand to assume a quasi-sovereign role to create subordi-
nate judicial structures within the territorial bounds that would otherwise
have been policed by responsible governmental structures.60 Nations are le-
gally obligated to accept the decisions of the Security Council.61 Hence, the
use of Chapter VII authority in this manner was both unprecedented and in-
genious because the international tribunals were grounded on a Security
Council determination that judicial accountability for crimes would facilitate
the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security.62 The
edifice of internationalized justice that has become such a familiar landmark
on the international scene in the past decade merely filled the void left by dys-
functional domestic systems.
In relation to the current debate over creating a supranational forum to re-
spond to terrorism, the essential feature of the ad hoc tribunals is the reality
that they were not created as an international response simply due to the
nature of the crimes as substantive violations of international law. Although
the ad hoc tribunals enjoyed legitimacy and authority over sovereign states im-
mediately upon their inception by virtue of the plenary authority of the Secu-
rity Council with respect to maintaining international peace and security,63
they represent a limited response to specific enforcement gaps. The specific
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59. See generally VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT FOR RWANDA (1998).
60. U.N. CHARTER art. 29. See also Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the
Development of International Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 78 (1994).
61. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
62. See Report of the Secretary General, supra note 58, paras. 18–30.
63. See, e.g., Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter),
I.C.J. REPORTS 151 (1962), reprinted in 56 AM. J. INT’L L. 1053 (1962)(holding in part that the
Security Council has plenary authority under the Charter to take decisions and order
enforcement measures under the Charter regime).
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conditions that warranted the creation of the ad hoc tribunals also led the Se-
curity Council to mandate a jurisdictional hierarchy in which each interna-
tional tribunal has explicit jurisdictional “primacy” over national courts.64
Therefore, the jurisdictional framework of the ad hoc tribunals in no way im-
plies an “inherent supremacy” for international tribunals over domestic forums
that derives simply from the nature of the underlying criminal offenses.
In the context of the war on terrorism, the formation of the ICTY and
ICTR do not warrant the assumption that international mechanisms are al-
ways the appropriate response to international crimes. The specific contextual
interests of eliminating the problem of impunity and restoring respect for the
rule of law mitigated against relying on domestic enforcement, but in no way
does that lead to the conclusion that an international forum is the appropriate
response to international crimes. Unlike the situation in the Former Yugosla-
via, international terrorists are private actors who act outside the constraints
of civilized society, and are therefore in no position to block state enforcement
mechanisms. In Rwanda, the international mechanism was an essential gap
filler to provide support to a collapsed judicial system.
As noted above, the jurisdictional hierarchy was a logical corollary to the
use of Chapter VII authority to establish the tribunals. As a legal matter, inter-
national efforts are hardly sufficient to be the sole source for dispensing jus-
tice.65 As a practical matter, the gap between the victims and the courts
remains yawning. An effort to create an international tribunal for prosecuting
terrorism would be similarly ineffective as the focal point of effective and com-
plete enforcement.
The newly established ICC is the culmination of recent efforts to create a
superstructure of international accountability mechanisms to address impunity
for international offenses. With respect to the proposal for an international
Michael Newton
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64. VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 126 n.378 (1995).
65. At the time of this writing, the ICTY has issued 79 current indictments; with 55 suspects in
legal proceedings (of which 44 are in custody and 11 are provisionally released under strict terms
issued by the Trial Chamber); 33 individuals are currently in various stages of trial while 30 cases
have been completed (20 indictments were withdrawn and 10 indictees were deceased). The
ICTR has issued 80 indictments of whom 60 persons are in custody while 20 remain at large; 8
persons have been sentenced, 1 acquitted; 22 are in trial and 29 are in custody.
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mechanism to try terrorists, it is significant that the Rome Statute did not in-
clude terrorism within its jurisdictional crimes because delegates could not
agree on the form of such an offense.66 Despite the clear rejection of ICC juris-
diction over terrorist crimes during the drafting of the Rome Statute, some ICC
proponents vocally maintained after September 11 that its provisions for punish-
ing crimes against humanity should be twisted to cover terrorist acts as well.
Attempts to stretch the jurisdictional bounds of the ICC to cover crimes of
terrorism would be the most blatant effort to superimpose international mech-
anisms over functioning domestic courts. As of its entry into force on July 1,
2002, the Rome Statute purports to establish a permanent supranational insti-
tution that enshrines the principle that state sovereignty can be subordinated
to the goal of achieving accountability for violations of international humani-
tarian law.67 Indeed, one commentator at the diplomatic conference in Rome
argued that “outmoded notions of state sovereignty must not derail the for-
ward movement” towards international peace and order.68 Even the most ar-
dent supporters of the ICC are careful not to portray its potential authority as
a naked exercise of political power, and view its erosion of state sovereignty
only as a necessary but limited incursion.
In other words, the creation of a supranational court empowered to over-
ride the unfettered discretion of some states is seen by the supporters of the
ICC as an overdue step towards a uniform system of responsibility designed to
“promote values fundamental to all democratic and peace-loving states.”69
Depending on their perspectives, commentators on the ICC see either princi-
pled leadership backed by the courage of deeply held convictions or stark hy-
pocrisy and self-serving opportunism.
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66. See Rome Statute, supra note 24, art 5.
67. See Rome Statute, supra note 24, arts 12–19. The extension of unchecked international
prosecutorial and judicial power over sovereign concerns is one of the primary reasons causing
the United States position to remain unwilling to go forward with the Rome Statute “in its
present form.” David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J.
INT’L L. 14, 21 (1999) [hereinafter Scheffer]. The United States joined international consensus
on the Final Draft Rules of Evidence and Procedure and the Final Draft Elements of Crimes on
June 30, 2000.
68. Benjamin Ferencz, Address to the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court (June 16, 1998),
available at http://www.un.org/icc/speeches/616ppc.htm (Jan. 30, 2003).
69. Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20 (2001); Bartram S. Brown,
Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and International
Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 436 (1998).
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Though its supporters approach the ICC as the penultimate development
of international criminal justice at the dawn of a new century, the roots of its
core jurisdictional limitation are intellectually identical to the Nuremberg Tri-
bunal and the ad hoc tribunals. Article 1 of the Rome Statute promulgates in
simple language that the court will “be a permanent institution and shall have
the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes
of international concern . . . and shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions.”70 The plain text of Article 1 compels the conclusion that the
ICC is intended to supplement sovereign punishment of international viola-
tions rather than supplant domestic enforcement of international norms.
Accordingly, a case is admissible before the ICC only where a domestic sov-
ereign that would otherwise exercise jurisdiction is “unwilling or unable to
genuinely” carry out the investigation or prosecution.71 The principle of
complementarity is a mandatory limitation even in a case in which the other
jurisdictional criteria are met because the Trial Chamber “shall determine
that a case is inadmissible” where the admissibility criteria are not met. After
hitting a diplomatic dead-end for nearly 70 years, persistent attempts to ex-
pand (some would say warp) the ICC jurisdictional scope over crimes of ter-
rorism due to their highly emotionalized nature and the rise of global concern
would subvert the complementarity mechanism. Paradoxically, such an ex-
pansion would vindicate the stringent arguments of those who view the supra-
national ICC mechanism simply as an international effort to undermine
sovereignty.
The Nuremberg Tribunal, the ICTR, the ICTY and now the ICC have
erected a formidable edifice of internationalized justice. At the same time,
it is absolutely clear that where domestic jurisdictions are functioning, the
internationalized response is not warranted (and in the case of the ICC not
permissible). Though the development of international institutions to enforce
international norms has broken new ground in the past fifty years and helped
to end impunity in some contexts, international mechanisms are not appro-
priate where domestic courts are complying with the rule of law and remain
capable of dispensing justice. Consequently, arguments for an international
terrorist court fall of their own weight unless they can demonstrate a gap that
such a mechanism would fill.
Michael Newton
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70. Rome Statute, supra note 24, art 1. Article 1 echoes the preambular language of the Rome
Statute in which the signatories affirm that effective prosecution of international crimes “must be
ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation.”
71. Rome Statute, supra note 24, art 17(1). For the negotiating history of the complementarity
regime, see Newton, supra note 69, at 44–55.
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An International Terrorist Court Has No Purpose
The heading just above would probably seem curious to a casual observer.
However, in light of the extensive jurisdictional framework conveying an ex-
tensive punitive capacity to sovereign forums, proponents of an international
terrorist tribunal bear the burden of establishing its usefulness on the interna-
tional landscape. The creation of an international mechanism to prosecute ter-
rorist crimes would be an inherently political exercise. It would cost a great deal
of money, and require the expenditure of an enormous amount of political good
will. One of the truths of international diplomacy is that international mecha-
nisms are created by the international community to achieve international in-
terests. A terrorist tribunal could actually encourage acts of terrorism if it
replaced relatively efficient domestic mechanisms with a cumbersome, expen-
sive, and slow process far removed from the realities of everyday prosecutorial
and diplomatic practice.
There is no preexisting gap in enforcement mechanisms that would be filled
by an internationalized process to address crimes of terrorism. As of now, the
sovereign states of the world have cooperated together in using the United Na-
tions structure to adopt twelve multilateral antiterrorist conventions (though
there are a number of other international instruments that address criminal
conduct that could be termed “terrorist” depending on the circumstances).
The core body of international instruments includes the following: Conven-
tion on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft72
(known as The Tokyo Convention, 1963); Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft73 (known as the Hague Hijacking Convention,
1970); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Civil Aviation74 (known as the Montreal Convention, 1971); Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents75 (1973); International Convention
344
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72. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sep. 14,
1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219, reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 1042 (1963).
73. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T.
1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 1333 (1971), available at http://www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/instree/hague1970.html (Jan. 30, 2003).
74. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sep.
23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 1151 (1971).
75. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S.
167, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 41 (1974), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/
inprotectedpersons.html (Jan. 30, 2003).
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against the Taking of Hostages76 (1979); Convention on the Physical Protec-
tion of Nuclear Material77 (1979); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplemen-
tary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Civil Aviation78 (known as the Montreal Protocol, 1988); Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation79
(1988); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf80 (1988); Convention on
the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection81 (1991); Inter-
national Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing82 (1997); and
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism83
(1999).
As noted above, the piecemeal approach to addressing terrorism resulted
from the failure of the international community, in conjunction with the
United Nations, to develop an overarching, comprehensive convention
against terrorism, largely because of lingering dissension over how to define
the scope of the international proscription against acts of terrorism. Taken to-
gether, the pile of terrorism treaties accomplishes several crucial purposes.
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76. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. 11081,
1316 U.N.T.S. 205, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1980), available at http://www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/instree/takinghostages.html (Jan. 30, 2003).
77. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, T.I.A.S. 11080,
1456 U.N.T.S. 101, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1419 (1980).
78. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International
Civil Aviation Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 974 U.N.T.S. 178, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 627 (1988).
79. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988).
80. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located
on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 685 (1988).
81. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991,
U.N. Doc. S/22393/Corr. 1, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 721 (1991).
82. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res. 52/164,
U.N. GOAR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc A/RES/52/164, Annex (1997), reprinted in M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS (1937–2001) 183
(2001), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/52/a52r164.htm (Jan. 30, 2003).
83. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 54/
109, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109, Annex (2000), entered into force Apr. 10, 2002,
available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/54/a54r109.pdf (Jan. 30, 2003).
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Each treaty lists the specific acts that states should proscribe under applica-
ble domestic law.84 It is fair to say that the international instruments address-
ing aspects of terrorism have been at the forefront of expanding the scope of
permissible domestic jurisdiction. The terrorist conventions built on estab-
lished principles of territorial and nationality jurisdiction through the devel-
opment of passive personality jurisdiction. Thus, this body of international
instruments allows a state party to establish personal jurisdiction over offend-
ers who direct attacks against its nationals regardless of the situs of the at-
tack.85 This principle has been extended to the point that if a perpetrator even
intends to intimidate the population or to compel a government to do or to
abstain from taking a particular act, that government may establish its crimi-
nal jurisdiction.86 The body of existing conventional law therefore gives sover-
eign states a robust ability to prosecute acts of international terrorism, and
generally supports jurisdiction of several states over any particular act or at-
tempted act of international terrorism.
In addition to establishing the norms and the clearly recognizable right for
sovereign states to enforce those substantive norms through domestic legisla-
tion, the existing framework deliberately facilitates the cooperative efforts
necessary to ensure the proper exercise of jurisdiction by one or more states.
The underlying goal of the conventions is to facilitate the administration of
justice in the state most able to prosecute the perpetrator. Thus, a recurring
feature of the texts requires a state party that apprehends an alleged offender
in its territory to submit that case “without exception whatsoever” to its com-
petent authorities without “undue delay” for purposes of prosecution or to ex-
tradite to another willing state.87 Furthermore, the treaties facilitate
extradition between sovereign states by specifically providing a legal basis ei-
ther through the text of the convention itself or by inclusion of the offenses
mentioned in the convention into existing or future extradition treaties be-
tween the parties. Lastly, the existing framework of domestic enforcement in-
corporates measures to ensure “the greatest measure of assistance” between
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84. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 32, 2331–2332e, 2339A, 3286, 3592 (2002). See also 28 U.S.C.A. 1605
(framing issues of jurisdiction).
85. See, e.g., Terrorist Bombing Convention, supra note 82, art. 6(2); Hostage Convention, supra
note 76, art. 5. See also Draft Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.252/L.3, reprinted in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS (1937–2001) 219 (2001).
86. See, e.g., Terrorist Bombing Convention, supra note 82, art. 2; Financing of Terrorism
Convention, supra note 83, art. 7(2)(c); Hostage Convention, supra note 76, art. 5(1)(c); Fixed
Platforms Convention, supra note 80, art. 3(2)(c).
87. See, e.g., Terrorist Bombing Convention, supra note 82, art. 8.
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states in connection with investigations and prosecutions related to acts of in-
ternational terrorism.88
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against In-
ternationally Protected Persons provides a representative sample of the opera-
tion of domestic mechanisms in responding to acts of international concern.
Its provisions require states parties to cooperate in order to prevent, within
their territories, preparations for attacks on diplomats within or outside their
territories, to exchange information, and to coordinate administrative mea-
sure against such attacks.89 If a perpetrator succeeds in attacking an interna-
tionally protected person, state parties are obligated to exchange available
information concerning the circumstances of the crime and the alleged of-
fender’s identity and whereabouts.90 Ultimately, the state in whose territory
the perpetrator is located must either extradite back to another state with ju-
risdiction or “submit, without exception and without undue delay, the case to
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings
in accordance with the laws of that State.”91
In short, for every terrorist crime committed or attempted, there will always
be one or more sovereign states that have both an available basis for extending
jurisdiction over the crimes and the motivation to do so. In relation to the
prosecution of terrorist crimes, there is simply no remaining function that an
internationalized process would serve. Nevertheless, if an internationalized
terrorism tribunal generated a marked deterrent effect on those who would
commit similar crimes in the future, the vast amount of dollars, yen, riyals, and
euros spent could be a bargain.
Evaluating the potentiality of an internationalized process as an instrument
of deterrence, it is worth noting that such an international forum would al-
most certainly be unable to administer capital punishment, and its deterrent
value would therefore be limited to an undetermined degree. Furthermore,
there is no empirical evidence whatsoever of any deterrent effect of interna-
tional justice mechanisms on the actions of real perpetrators in the real world
who inflict their crimes on real victims. As Justice Jackson famously pointed
out in his opening statement at Nuremberg, “[w]ars are started only on the
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88. See, e.g., Terrorist Bombing Convention, supra note 82, art. 10(1).
89. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, supra note 75, art. 4.
90. Id., art. 5.
91. Id., art. 7.
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theory and in the confidence that they can be won. Personal punish-
ment . . . will probably not be a sufficient deterrent to prevent a war where the
war makers feels the chances of defeat to be negligible.”92
Justice Jackson was just articulating the enduring truth that international
relations theorists are familiar with—regime elites are risk averse actors. If
they see a high probability of punishment and adverse consequences, human
psychology will often prevent the undesirable conduct. In the field of enforc-
ing international norms, this is what we have termed “ending the cycle of im-
punity.” In the context of deterring violations of humanitarian law, criminal
prosecutions by international tribunals have a theoretical effect, but good
hopes and genuine aspirations cannot substitute for the power of genuine de-
terrence. Terrorist actors would presumably be even less susceptible to exter-
nal coercion because their modus operandi is to operate beyond the
constraints of the rule of law and organized international society.
The Kosovo experience is the best available case study on the deterrent ef-
fect of an internationalized process, and it served to demonstrate the need for
genuine deterrence rather than idealistic assertions of legal proscription. The
Security Council repeatedly affirmed ICTY jurisdiction in an ongoing effort to
prevent abuses by the Milosevic regime inside Kosovo, and expressly ordered
the Belgrade regime to cooperate with the investigative efforts of tribunal per-
sonnel.93 The same resolution directed the ICTY prosecutor to “begin gather-
ing information related to the violence in Kosovo that may fall within its
jurisdiction.”94
In the face of an existing international forum with clear jurisdiction and
stated international support, Serbian forces massacred forty-five innocent ci-
vilians at Racak, Kosovo, crimes that ultimately contributed to the NATO in-
tervention in Operation ALLIED FORCE.95 While governments grumbled over
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92. TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 153, supra note 52, at 153.
93. See, e.g., S. C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1160/(1998).
94. Id., para. 17.
95. Even as the NATO nations gathered in Washington to observe the 50th anniversary of the
alliance, operations in Kosovo threatened to unravel the international posture that NATO is a
community of common values based on principles of sovereignty, individual liberty, and respect
for the rule of law. Operation ALLIED FORCE represented the resolve of the world’s strongest
military/political alliance to take concrete action against despots who commit intolerable
atrocities. By failing to take strong, if belated, action in the face of the crimes against humanity
committed by the Belgrade regime, NATO would have looked cynical and irrelevant to the
security and peace in Europe. THE ECONOMIST 15, Apr. 24, 1999.
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the perceived slow pace of the ICTY investigations,96 the Rambouillet docu-
ment reiterated ICTY jurisdiction over events in Kosovo through an explicit
provision that required the cooperation of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY) officials with the investigative efforts by ICTY.97
Despite the clear warnings of the international community, and express ju-
risdiction of a functioning international tribunal, Belgrade’s forces expelled
over 1.5 million Albanians from their homes, committed uncounted rapes, pil-
laged whole communities, destroyed tens of thousands of civilian homes in at
least 1,200 communities, and murdered an estimated 10,000 Kosovar civil-
ians.98 The ICTY subsequently indicted Slobodan Milosevic and four of his se-
nior officials for crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs
of war committed in Kosovo,99 one count of which specifically charged the
Racak massacre. This indictment and the trials it will spawn continue to spark
debate and keen interest in the law of armed conflict throughout the world.
Nevertheless, the Milosevic indictment represented an unequivocal deter-
rence failure for the established legal codes and judicial framework and the best
measure of the likely deterrent effect of an international terrorist tribunal.
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96. Charles Truehart, A New Kind of Justice, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 80 (April 2000). In
February, 1999, the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe reported that there were at least 210,000 internally displaced Kosovars, and reported the
lack of cooperation by FRY officials with the surviving relatives of the victims from the Racak
massacre. U.N. Doc. S/1999/214/(1999). This unwavering Security Council support was
ultimately expressed in the Chapter VII resolution authorizing the international military and
civil presence in Kosovo, which “demanded” full cooperation by all parties with the pending
investigative efforts in the wake of the humanitarian disaster in Kosovo in the first six months of
1999. S. C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1244/para. 14/(1999).
97. See Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo,
U.N. Doc. S/1999/648, annex, Art. II, para. 13 (1999).
All parties shall comply with their obligation to cooperate in the investigation and
prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law.
a) As required by United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) and
subsequent resolutions, the Parties shall fully cooperate with the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in its investigations and prosecutions, including
complying with its requests for assistance and its orders.
b) The Parties shall also allow complete, unimpeded, and unfettered access to
international experts—including forensics experts and investigators—to investigate
allegations of serious violations of international humanitarian law.
98. ETHNIC CLEANSING IN KOSOVO: AN ACCOUNTING, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 3 (Dec. 1999).
An earlier version of the report was compiled by the State Department, which also issued a series of
weekly ethnic cleansing reports, available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur (Jan. 30, 2003).
99. Prosecutor v Milosevic, et al, Indictment, No. IT-99-37 (May 24, 1999), available at http://
www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ii990524e.htm (Jan. 30, 2003).
E:\BLUE BOOK\VOL 79 TERROR\VENTURA FILES\VOL 79 BB TERROR 11_18_03.VP
Thursday, April 28, 2005 8:21:47 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Security Council Resolution 1373
On September 28, 2001, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter, adopted Resolution 1373, which on its face is an extraordinary state-
ment of international unity and purpose.100 In the post-September 11 tidal
wave of international concern and cooperation, states had the opportunity to
revisit the approach that has been developed in dealing with international ter-
rorism. The patchwork quilt of conventional law, implemented and adminis-
tered through sovereign systems, is clearly not a complete solution, but the
Security Council unanimously elected to reinforce the existing framework.
Rather than opting for an internationalized process, the Security Council pre-
cisely framed the language of Resolution 1373 to buttress the current approach.
Resolution 1373 uses sweeping language to impose a duty on states to enact
legislation and to punish the crimes of terrorism. The operative paragraph di-
rects every nation in the world to
[e]nsure that any person who participates in the financing, planning,
preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is
brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other measures against
them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic
laws and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of
such terrorist acts.101
Because transnational terrorism is an illegal and immoral epidemic that under-
mines the stability of world order, the Security Council employed its binding
authority under Chapter VII to craft the most effective response possible. It is
important that the Security Council focused on improving and implementing
the sovereign enforcement of international norms rather than instituting an in-
ternationalized judicial response.
In its landmark statement outlining the international response to terrorism,
the Security Council also established a number of additional steps that member
states are required to take to combat terrorism. For example, the Council
“[d]ecides that all States shall . . . [p]revent and suppress the financing of ter-
rorist acts”102 and then mandated other explicit steps that states are to take
350
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100. S. C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1373/(2001).
101. Id., para. 2(c).
102. Id., para. 1(a).
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such as facilitating early warning to other states through the exchange of infor-
mation,103 denying safe haven to terrorists,104 and preventing the movement of
terrorists by effective border controls and controls on the issuance of identity
papers and travel documents.105 In the context of criminal investigations and
prosecutions, states must “[a]fford one another the greatest measure of assis-
tance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relat-
ing to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in
obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings.”106
Finally, the Security Council exhorted all sovereign states to take a number
of cooperative actions to combat terrorism, including, among others, “intensi-
fying and accelerating the exchange of operational information,”107 becoming
parties to the relevant antiterrorist conventions, including the International
Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism,108 and ensuring,
“in conformity with international law,” that refugee status is not abused by
terrorists, and that “claims of political motivation are not recognized as
grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists.”109
Conclusion
My view is that an international tribunal in the present circumstances is an
inadvisable and unnecessary aspect of the response to transnational terrorism.
The world will successfully combat terrorism by aggressively cooperating to
engage, investigate, hunt down, and prosecute those terrorists who survive
military action against them. We’ve already seen investigations in countries
all around the world that have uncovered links to terrorism—and if the press
is credible, have prevented some terrorist attacks. Abdicating state responsi-
bility to an internationalized process would be the first step towards paralyzing
politicization of the fight against terrorism and could pave the way towards ul-
timate failure in this critical global campaign.
In lieu of creating a superstructure of international enforcement, the Secu-
rity Council used Resolution 1373 to take the revolutionary step of establishing
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103. Id., para. 2(b).
104. Id., para. 2(c).
105. Id., para. 2(g).
106. Id., para. 2(f).
107. Id., para. 3(a).
108. Id., para. 3(d).
109. Id., para. 3(g).
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a committee (the Counter-Terrorism Committee) to monitor state implemen-
tation of its terms. The Security Council asked all states to report to the com-
mittee, no later than 90 days after the date of adoption of the resolution, on the
steps they have taken to implement the various aspects of the resolution.110
This is an important effort at identifying the gaps that can be addressed
through international assistance in creating a more certain expectancy of jus-
tice for those terrorists and would be terrorists who ignore and undermine the
international order. In addition to the subsequent Security Council statements
on terrorism, the reports that sovereign states have delivered to the Counter-
Terrorism Committee regarding the concrete steps and present status of inter-
national progress in prosecuting terrorist crimes are available on-line.111 The
pathway towards a more secure future for us all treads the terrain of a vibrant
international cooperation and sovereign investigations and prosecution. An
international terrorist tribunal would disrupt that vital process.
International Criminal Law Aspects of the War Against Terrorism
352
110. Id., para. 6.
111. See http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/ (Jan. 30, 2003).
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